



Abstract.	 	 A	 growing	 literature	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 leader	 image	 as	 a	
determinant	of	voting	in	contemporary	democracies,	as	a	force	now	paralleling	the	
explanatory	power	of	traditional	structural	and	ideological	factors	affecting	voting	
choice.	 Yet	 the	 actual	 effect	 of	 leaders	 in	 the	 citizen’s	 vote	 calculus	 remains	
uncertain	because	of	the	potential	reciprocal	causation	between	leader	evaluation	
and	 other	 vote	 determinants.	 	 Thus,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 voters’	 appreciation	 of	
leaders	 depends	 on	 their	 personality	 traits	 or	 on	 their	 policies,	 and	 how	 these	
forces	 variously	 influence	 the	 vote,	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess.	 To	 cope	 with	 this	













calculus	 of	 voting	 has	 increased	 in	 recent	 years.	 	 Scholars	 have	 documented	
increasing	leader	visibility	and	influence	in	the	electoral	campaigns	(Swanson	and	
Mancini,	 1996),	 in	 the	 parties	 (Scarrow,	 Webb	 and	 Farrell,	 2000)	 and	 in	 the	
executive	 branch	 of	 parliamentary	 democracies	 (Karvonen,	 2010).	 	 Such	




Clarke	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 2009;	 Bellucci,	 2006)	 leader	 likeability	 contributes	 to	 the	
popular	 evaluation	 of	 their	 party	 which,	 with	 partisanship	 and	 economic	
considerations	(Lewis‐Beck	and	Stegmaier,	2007),	strongly	orient	voter	choice.	
Yet	research	on	the	personalization	of	politics	has	not	reached	a	consensus	
on	 the	 leader	 effect,	 even	 concerning	 the	 impact	 from	 leaders’	 images	 on	 voting	
itself.		Prevailing	opinion	on	such	an	effect	in	parliamentary	democracies	has	been	
rather	 skeptical	 (King,	 2002a;	 Curtice	 and	 Holberg,	 2005;	 Karvonen,	 2010).		
Indeed,	 a	 recent	 assessment	 of	 party	 leader	 effects	 in	democratic	 elections	 finds	
that	 “party	 effects	 are	 clearly	 stronger	 than	 party	 leader	 effects”	 (Holberg	 and	
Oscarson,	2011:	39).	
	 	
Therefore,	 uncertainty	 persists	 regarding	 the	 relevance	 of	 leader	 effects,	
with	 respect	 to	 their	 absolute	 and	 relative	 impact.	 	 Here	we	 confront	 this	 issue,	
maintaining	 that	much	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 leaders	 comes	 from	 the	
way	 the	 leader	effect	 is	 conceptualized	and	measured.	 It	has	been	rightly	argued	
that	a	reciprocal	relationship	exists	between	voters’	evaluation	of	leaders	and	their	
evaluation	of	the	parties:	“People	tend	to	like	leaders	of	parties	they	like	and	since	
most	people	 tend	 to	vote	 for	parties	 they	 like,	we	have	a	problem”	(Holberg	and	
Oscarson,	2011:	37).	Hence	the	difficulty	in	assessing	leader	effects,	which	requires	
one	 to	 “disentangl[e]	 the	 impact	 of	 leaders	 from	 that	 of	 the	 parties	 they	 lead”	
(Gidengil	and	Blais,	2007:	14).	Curtice	and	Holberg	(2005:	236)	go	on	to	observe	
that	 “the	 power	 of	 the	 leaders	 lies	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 lead	 and	mould	 their	 party	
rather	than	their	ability	to	appeal	to	voters	independently	of	their	party.”	Thus,	the	
suggestion	 is	 that	 the	 electoral	 effect	 of	 leaders	 lies	 not	 only	 in	 their	 personal	
appeal,	but	as	well	in	their	capacity	to	shape	the	party’s	offer	to	voters	in	terms	of	
political	and	ideological	stances.		
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 begin	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 causality	 between	 voters’	
assessment	of	party	issues	and	party	leaders	is	reciprocal,	with	X	influencing	Y	and	
Y	influencing	X	(Miller	and	Shanks,	1996;	Macdonald	et	al.,	1998).	Such	reciprocal	
causation	 generates	 serious	 difficulties	 when	 the	 usual	 regression	 estimation	
techniques	are	applied,	namely	 the	problem	of	 simultaneous	equation	bias.	Here	
	 	
we	 cope	 with	 this	 endogeneity	 problem	 by	 using	 panel	 data	 and	 instrumental	
variables	estimation.		Through	careful	application	of	structural	equation	methods,	
in	the	context	of	real	change	over	time,	we	are	able	to	explain	the	extent	to	which	
voters’	 support	 for	 leaders	depends	on	 their	parties’	policies	and	vice‐versa,	 and	
how	these	forces	influence	the	vote.		
We	employ	data	from	the	2006	Italian	parliamentary	election,	for	it	allows	
an	 ideal	 natural	 experiment	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 leader	 effect	 on	 voting.		
After	the	1994	collapse	of	traditional	cleavage	parties,	a	new	catch‐all	party	system	
emerged.		Voters	were	largely	orphaned	from	previous	partisanships,	and	faced	a	
main	political	 contender,	 Silvio	Berlusconi,	 founder	of	 Italy’s	 largest	party,	Forza	
Italia,	and	owner	of	a	near‐monopoly	private	TV	network.	The	 launch	of	his	new	
personal	 party	 (Calise,	 2000),	 based	 on	 a	 strong,	 controversial	 usage	 of	 political	
marketing	 and	 television,	 brought	 about	 greater	 visibility	 of	 political	 leaders	
(Mazzoleni,	 1996;	 Calise,	 2005).	 	 In	 fact,	 voting	 research	 has	 uncovered	 an	
unprecedented,	strong	 leader	 image	effect,	 in	particular	 from	Berlusconi,	on	vote	
choice	(Sani,	2002).	
Our	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 a	 legislative	 election	 which	 saw	 the	 incumbent	





5%	 lead	 for	 Prodi’s	 coalition,	 so	 raising	 expectations	 of	 centre‐left	 victory.	 To	
counteract,	Berlusconi	engaged	directly	in	a	strong	television	campaign,	exploiting	
his	 influence	 on	 the	 TV	 channels	 to	 insure	 coverage.	 The	 success	 of	 the	










Spatial	models	 of	 party	 competition	 assume	 that	 voting	 is	 best	 explained	 by	 the	






the	 latter	rests	on	heuristic	 reasoning.	Focusing	on	 the	voters’	 cognitive	process,	
there	seems	to	be	an	inherent	reciprocal	causation	between	voters’	perception	of	
parties’	 policy	 outlook	 and	 the	 image	 of	 their	 leaders.	 Voters’	 issue	 preferences	
may	shape	the	image	of	the	party	leader,	just	as	the	likeability	of	the	leaders	may	
affect	 the	voters’	perceptions	of	parties’	policy	stances.	Miller	and	Shanks	 (1996:	
207)	 frame	 this	 cognitive	 process	 in	 terms	 of	 “persuasion”	 effects,	 according	 to	
which	voters	adjust	their	own	policy	preferences	to	match	the	position	of	the	party	
they	have	already	chosen	because	of	other	factors.	Thus,	a	party	can	be	perceived	
closer	 to	 a	voter’s	position	because	of	 the	 appeal	of	 the	party’s	 leader.	This	may	
produce,	 as	 Macdonald	 et	 al.	 (1998)	 argue,	 a	 “rationalization”	 effect	 which	
contaminates	voters’	evaluation	of	a	party’s	issue	position.	Voters	may	be	induced	
to	 locate	 a	 party	 closer	 to	 themselves	 on	 issues	 because	 they	 like	 the	 party	 for	
other	reasons.	In	this	case	“it	is	wrong	to	claim	that	issue	proximity	causes	positive	
evaluation.	 In	 fact,	 the	 reverse	 is	 true:	 proximity	 follows	 from	 prior	 affect”	
(Macdonald	 et	 al.,	 1998:	 672).	 Conversely,	 a	 party’s	 position	 on	 the	 issues	 may	
push	voters	to	evaluate	that	party’s	leader	more	favorably.		
From	 a	 different	 perspective,	 King’s	 (2002b)	 seminal	 distinction	 between	
direct	 and	 indirect	 effects	 further	 helps	 to	 illustrate	 the	 ambiguous	 covariation	
between	 these	 factors,	at	 the	same	 time	shedding	 light	on	 the	contours	of	 leader	
influence.	 Leaders	may	 influence	 voting	directly,	 via	 their	 personality,	 individual	
	 	
characteristics	and	overall	appeal	to	voters,	or	indirectly,	by	affecting	the	profile	of	
the	parties	 and	 their	 policy	 stances.	 Indirect	 influence	 is	 exerted	 “when	a	 leader	
influences	voters,	not	as	a	result	anything	he	or	she	is,	but	as	a	result	of	things	that	
he	 or	 she	 does…The	 leader	 who	 succeeds	 in	 changing	 his	 party’s	 ideology	 or	
modernizing	its	image	is	exerting	influence	in	this	indirect	sense’	(King,	2002b:	4–
5;	italics	in	original).	No	doubt	Silvio	Berlusconi	has	exerted	such	influence,	firstly	
by	 founding	and	 leading	 the	party,	but	secondly	by	shaping	 its	policy	stance	and	





forces,	 on	 disparate	 issues	 such	 as	 pacifism,	 bio‐ethics	 and	 taxation.	 Prodi,	 not	
unlike	Berlusconi,	was	then	associated	in	the	people’s	mind	with	the	Union	and	its	
manifesto.	Both	 leaders,	 therefore,	 contributed	significantly	 to	 the	shaping	of	 the	
programs	of	their	electoral	coalition.	The	voters’	image	of	the	party	(coalition)	and	






on	 personality	 and	 individual	 characteristics	 –	 defines	 their	 overall	 appeal	 to	
voters	 (Miller	 et	 al.,	 1986).	 Previous	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 voters	 develop	 a	
mental	image	of	political	leaders	as	persons	on	the	basis	of	a	restricted	number	of	
categories	 namely,	 competence,	 leadership,	 honesty,	 and	 empathy	 (Kinder,	 1986;	





mainly	 assessed	 the	 impact	 of	 leaders	 on	 voting	 choice	 by	 adopting	 a	 research	
design	based	on	an	 improved‐prediction	strategy.	 	That	 is,	 the	method	of	entering	
sequentially	 variables	 according	 to	 the	 supposed	 causal	 impact	 of	 voting	
determinants,	 from	 long‐term	 to	 short‐term	 ones.	 Typically,	 entering	 the	 leader	
variable	 last	 produces	 a	 positive	 assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 leader	 image	 on	




“…the	 precise	 relationship	 between	 leadership	 and	 party	 images	 cannot	 be	 fully	
	 	
determined	 given	 the	 limited	 data	 available…Our	 bloc	 recursive	models	 assume	
that	 party	 and	 leader	 images	 are	 located	 at	 the	 same	 stage	 within	 our	 model”	
(Bartle	and	Crewe,	2002:	80‐81).	To	overcome	this	constraint,	Clarke	et	al.	(2004:	
117)	 analyzed	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 feelings	 about	 party	 leaders,	 finding	 a	
positive	relationship	with	party‐issue	proximity.	Their	testing	for	simultaneity	bias	
however	 lead	 them	 to	 conclude	 that	 feelings	 about	 party	 leaders	 are	 weakly	
exogenous	to	electoral	choice.	3			
Our	 analysis	 overcomes	 the	 limitations	 stemming	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	
simultaneity	 bias,	 building	 on	 the	 Clarke	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 notion	 of	 the	 possible	
exogeneity	 (albeit	 weak)	 of	 party	 leader	 feelings.	 	 To	 enhance	 the	 exogeneity	
argument,	we	directly	 allow	 the	possibility	of	 simultaneity,	 and	attempt	 to	more	
strongly	exogenize	leader,	as	well	as	issue,	variables.	Relying	on	the	2006	ITANES	
Electoral	 Panel	 Study,	 we	 disentangle	 the	 reciprocal	 causation	 by	 examining	
before‐and‐after	 election	 panel	 waves,	 and	 by	 exogenizing	 both	 party	 and	
leadership	 variables	 via	 instrumental	 variable	 estimation.	 Our	 research	 strategy	
unfolds	through	panel	and	causal	analysis,	with:	(a)	formulation	of	a	two‐equation	
system	of	 the	 reciprocal	effects	of	 leaders	on	 issues,	 and	 issues	on	 leaders;	 (b)	a	
two‐stage	regresssion	estimation	of	the	reciprocal	net	effects	of	leaders	and	issues	





out	 in	 two	 waves.	 The	 first,	 conducted	 in	 February	 2006	 before	 the	 election,	
interviewed	 face‐to‐face	 a	 national	 representative	 sample	 of	 voters.	 Of	 the	 2005	
respondents	who	completed	the	interview,	70%	were	re‐interviewed	immediately	
after	 the	 election,	 in	 April‐May	 (n=1377).	 This	 post‐election	 survey	 serves	 a	
baseline	 for	 estimation	 of	 a	 straightforward	model	 of	 vote	 choice,	 following	 the	
common	practice	of	analyzing	a	national	election	survey	in	a	single	cross‐section.			
We	begin	with	an	assessment	of	the	direct	electoral	effect	of	leaders	and	issues	on	
vote	 choice,	 offering	 a	 parsimonious	model	 where	 vote	 is	 a	 function	 of	 leaders’	
synoptic	 evaluation	 (Leaders)	 and	 voters’	 coalition	utilities	 (Issues),	 plus	 a	 set	 of	
standard	 controls	 that	 describe	 respondents’	 placement	 in	 the	 social	 structure,		
thusly:	
	
(Eq.	1)		 Votet	 =	 Leaderst	 +	 Issuest	 +	 Age	 +	 Gender	 +	 Education	 +	 SocialClass	 +	
ChurchAttendance	+	E								
	




scale,	 voters’	 likability	 of	 the	 leaders.	 Prodi’s	 score	 has	 been	 subtracted	 from	
Berlusconi’	s	 ,	and	re‐scaled	0‐1	so	that	 the	 lowest	value	of	0	means	the	greatest	
support	for	Prodi	and	the	smallest	for	Berlusconi,	and	1	means	the	opposite.4				
In	 order	 to	 measure	 Issues,	 we	 operationalize	 party	 (coalition)	
attractiveness	 according	 to	 voters’	 issue	 preferences.	 Relying	 on	 a	 Downsian	
approach,	we	have	calculated	the	voters’	coalition	utilities	by	summing	the	voter‐
coalition	 distance	 over	 three	 issues	 that	 were	 prominent	 in	 the	 campaign.		




the	 two	 coalitions;	 (2)	 two	 additive	 indexes	 have	 been	 then	 created:	 one	
measuring	 the	 policy	 distance	 between	 each	 respondent	 and	 the	 centre‐left	
coalition	(IssuesLeft)	and	another	measuring	the	same	individual’s	distance	to	the	
centre‐right	 coalition	 (IssuesRight).	 The	 indexes	 have	 values	 ranging	 between	 0	





























Leaders	 and	 Issues	 are	 statistically	 significant	 at	 some	 conventional	 level,	 and	





is	 necessarily	 in	 question,	 because	 the	 design	 is	 cross‐sectional,	 using	 post‐
electoral	measures	 to	 predict	 post‐electoral	measures.	 Our	 research	 strategy	 for	
disentangling	 this	 causality,	 which	 we	 pursue	 with	 vigor	 below,	 begins	 with	
utilization	of	the	pre‐election,	post‐election	panel	design	that	the	2006	Panel	study	







survey.	 	 Second,	we	want	 to	 sort	 out	 the	 reciprocal	 effects	 between	Leaders	 and	
	 	
Issues.	To	accomplish	the	latter	goal,	we	must	move	to	a	two‐equation	system,	one	
for	Leaders	 and	one	 for	 Issues.	 	 Let	 us	 start	with	 the	 specification	of	 the	Leaders	
equation.	 Previous	 research	 shows	 that	 leaders’	 personality	 traits	 influence	









R‐squared	 are	 .46	 and	 .56),	 further	 suggesting	 that	 the	 voters	 became	 better	
acquainted	with	the	leaders	during	the	campaign.		Besides	leader	traits,	we	add	a	
StrongLeader	variable,	captured	by	agree‐disagree	answers	to	the	statement	“Italy	






Now	 for	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 Issues	 equation	 itself,	 we	 include	 first	 the	
respondents’	 LeftRight	 self‐placement	 under	 the	 obvious	 hypothesis	 that	 voters’	
ideological	orientation	 structures	 their	party	utilities.10	 	We	 then	add	 the	voters’	
salience	of	issues,	measured	as	the	respondents’	rating	of	the	importance	of	given	
issues	on	a	1	(not	at	all	important)	to	7	(very	important)	scale.	These	variables	tap	
the	 individual	 propensity	 of	 voters	 to	 use	 issues	 as	 heuristics	 to	 make	 political	
judgments.	 Ideally	we	would	have	chosen	to	 include	the	salience	of	all	 the	 issues	
which	 comprise	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 However,	 as	 all	 measures	 were	 not	
available	 in	 the	 data	 set,	 we	 relied	 on	 the	 salience	 of	 two	 issues,	
UnemploymentSalience	 and	 CriminalitySalience.	 	 These	 salience	measures	 should	
influence	our	 issue	measure,	 if	 for	no	other	 reason	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 salience	of	
issues	 helps	 structure	 thinking	 about	 the	 issues	 themselves.	 For	 example,	 for	
voters	who	think	crime	is	salient,	they	are	more	likely	to	have	an	opinion	on	that	
issue.	 	The	 correlation	of	 these	opinions	will	not	be	 random,	with	 respect	 to	 the	






















The	 equations	 are	 estimated	 (ordinary	 least	 squares	 –	 OLS)	 in	 Table	 2	
(Panel	 A1	 and	 Panel	 B1).	 The	 model	 fits	 appear	 satisfactory,	 with	 adjusted	 R‐
squared	of	.61	and	.48,	respectively.		These	strong	numbers	are	encouraging,	given	
that	the	independent	variables,	mirroring	to	some	extent	causality	in	real	time,	are	





well	 exceeds	 the	 effect	 of	 Leaders	 on	 Issues,	 with	 bIssues	 =	 .44,	 and	 bLeaders	 =	 .30.		





Exogenizing	 the	 effects	 of	 leaders	 on	 issues	 and	 vice‐versa:	 Instrumental	
variables	estimation	
This	OLS	bias	 stems	 from	 the	 correlation	 of	 the	 ordinary	 independent	 variables,	




variables,	 labeled	 L’	 and	 I’,	 are	 constructed	 from	 available	 exogenous	 variables.	
Note	that	only	exogenous	variables	should	be	used	for	this	purpose,	because	they	
are	 uncorrelated	 with	 the	 error	 terms,	 and	 hence	 will	 render	 the	 instrumental	
variable	likewise	uncorrelated.11			
	 	
To	build	 the	 instruments,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 the	variables	 selected	 for	 the	
task	 truly	 are	 exogenous.	 If	 that	 criterion	 is	 not	 met,	 the	 procedure	 will	 not	
overcome	 the	 bias	 problem.	 	 To	 hold	 exogenous	 status,	 these	 variables	must	 be	
caused	by	forces	outside	the	system	of	equations,	and	must	not	be	correlated	with	
the	 model	 error	 terms	 (on	 these	 points,	 consult	 the	 valuable	 discussion	 in	
Woolridge,	 2006:	 525‐540).	 	Most	measures	 of	 socioeconomic	 status	 conform	 to	
this	 standard,	 tending	 to	 be	 fixed	 characteristics	 the	 respondent	 brings	 to	 the	
voting	booth.		Also,	overarching,	basic	attitudes,	e.g.,	political	interest	or	attitudes	
toward	democracy,	can	achieve	exogenous	rank.				
With	 these	 guidelines	 in	 mind,	 we	 came	 up	 with	 a	 set	 of	 variables	 we	
believe	meet	rather	strict	exogeneity	conditions.		First,	note	that	they	are	from	the	
pre‐election	 wave,	 which	 ensures	 they	 meet	 the	 important	 causal	 criterion	 of	
occurring	prior	in	time.		Here	is	the	list	of	available	SES	variables	considered:	age,	
gender,	 education,	 social	 class,	 church	 attendance.	 	 And,	 here	 is	 the	 list	 of	 basic	
attitudes	considered:	interest	in	politics,	exposure	to	TV	news	from	state/private,	
and	 retrospective	 economic	 evaluation.	 With	 these,	 we	 construct	 instruments	 I’	
and	L’.	 	However,	we	cannot	use	 them	all	 to	 render	each	 instrument,	because	an	
insurmountable	 collinearity	 problem	 would	 ensue.	 Therefore,	 they	 were	
systematically	 separated	 into	 two	 groups,	 to	 guarantee	 their	 adequate	 statistical	
independence	and,	at	the	same	time,	maximize	their	predictive	power	as	a	proxy.12			
	 	
The	 two	 sets	 of	 exogenous	 variables,	 respectively,	 correlate	 well	 with	 the	
endogenous	Leaders	variable	(R=	.41)	and	the	endogenous	Issues	variable	(R	=	.42).	
Thus,	 we	 have	 confidence	 in	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 two	 instruments,	 whose	 inter‐
correlation	has	now	dropped	to	r	=	 .35,	down	from	the	r	=	 .68	observed	between	




the	 right‐hand	 side	 of	 Equations	 2	 and	 3	 yields	 the	 estimates	 which	 appear	 in	
Table	2	(Panel	A2	and	Panel	B2).	Exogenizing	Issues	and	Leaders	has	not	affected	
the	structure	of	 the	models,	 as	all	 the	other	variables	 retain	 the	previous	 impact	
(as	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 columns	 1).	 What	 has	 changed,	 however,	 is	 their	 relative	
influence,	with	Issues	now	carrying	an	impact	on	Leaders	(bIssues‐hat	=	.33)	over	two	
times	greater	than	that	of	Leaders	on	Issues	(bLeaders‐hat	=	.15).	Careful	treatment	of	
the	 inherent	 endogeneity	 has	 therefore	 changed	 our	 reading	 of	 the	 reciprocal	













the	 impact	 of	 Issues	 and	 Leaders	 on	 the	 electors’	 choice?	 While	 in	 the	 initial	
estimate	(see	Table	1)	the	Leaders	impact	was	almost	twice	that	of	Issues,	here	the	






is	 graphically	 summarized	 in	Figure	1,	which	 shows	 the	predicted	probability	 of	
centre‐right	vote	according	to	the	respondent’s	coalition	utilities	and	evaluation	of	













we	 have	 not	 therefore	 taken	 into	 account	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 electoral	 campaign	
(taking	 place	 from	 February	 to	 April).	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 this	
campaign	was	intense	and	could	have	likely	affected	the	voters’	perception	of	both	
leaders’	 images	 and	 party	 policy	 positions.	 Actually,	 while	 among	 voters	 with	 a	
centre‐right	 or	 a	 centre‐left	 vote	 propensity	 before	 the	 elections	 Berlusconi	 and	






To	 take	 into	 account	 the	 possibility	 of	 this	 campaign	 influence,	 we	
exogenized	Leaders	 and	 Issues	 as	 before	 but	 using	 exogenous	 variables	 from	 the	
second	wave,	after	the	election	campaign.	This	allows	any	effect	from	the	campaign	






and	 that	 selection	 might	 appear	 arbitrary	 to	 some.	 Thus,	 we	 excluded	 one	
exogenous	 variable	 at	 a	 time	 from	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 instrument,	 and	 re‐
estimated	Eqs.	2	and	3,	respectively,	with	these	new	instruments.		We	observe	that	
the	model	adjusted	R‐squared	barely	budges;	for	Leaders,	it	goes	from	.40‐.41,	for	
Issues	 from	 .55‐.56.	 Thus,	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 second‐stage,	 instrumented	
models	does	not	appear	to	rest	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	particular	variable.	
	 The	third,	and	final,	exercise	concerns	the	presence	of	media	exposure	and	
retrospective	 economics	 as	 exogenous	 variables,	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
instruments.	 	Since	one	of	 these	variables	serves	 for	 the	Leaders	 instrument,	and	
the	other	 serves	 for	 the	 Issues	 instrument,	 it	might	be	argued	 that	 this	 service	 is	





with	 the	 endogenous	 Leaders	 and	 Issues	 variables,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 old	
instruments	 (respectively:	 .42	 and	 .36).	 Moreover,	 and	 most	 importantly,	 when	
these	 new	 instruments	 are	 included	 in	 the	 vote	 model	 (a	 la	 Eq.3),	 the	 Issues	
coefficient	continues	to	be	almost	twice	that	of	the	Leaders	coefficient,	8.70/4.96.	





The	 role	 of	 political	 leaders	 has	 grown	 in	 contemporary	 democracies,	 and	 their	
electoral	 appeal	 is	 assumed	 to	have	 increased.	Yet,	 voting	behavior	 research	has	
not	reached	a	consensus	on	the	actual	contours	of	such	a	leader	effect,	mainly	due	
to	 the	 difficulty	 of	 disentangling	 the	 reciprocal	 causation	 among	 independent	
variables	in	the	voting	equation.	In	this	paper	we	have	squarely	faced	the	task	of	




to	 the	 collapse	 of	 traditional	 cleavage	 parties	 and	 the	 ensuing	 strong	
personalization	of	politics	–	represents	a	favorable	case	to	test	the	hypothesis	of	an	
enhanced	 leader	 effect	 on	 voting	 choice.	 After	 careful	 treatment	 of	 the	 inherent	
endogeneity	 between	 voters’	 party	 utilities	 and	 leader	 evaluations,	 we	 find	 that	
both	 forces	 do	 exert	 an	 influence	 on	 voting.	 However,	 and	 contrary	 to	 previous	
research,	 we	 also	 find	 that	 party	 utilities	 outweigh	 leaders’	 likeability	 as	 a	
determinant	 of	 the	 vote.	 This	 result	 is	 particularly	 significant	 given	 the	 2006	
macro‐institutional	 and	 political	 context	 of	 the	 elections,	 which	 should	 have	
greatly	 favored	 the	 leader	 effect.	 Party	 competition	 had	 a	 bipolar	 format,	 a	
condition	 that	 comparative	 literature	 on	 parliamentary	 democracies	 argues	
enhances	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 leader	 on	 voting	 (Barisione,	 2009).	 Also	 the	 electoral	
system,	a	 further	condition	highlighted	by	previous	research	(ibid.)	mitigated	the	
(depressing)	 effect	 of	proportional	 representation	on	 leaders’	 assessment	by	 the	
introduction	 of	 a	 majority	 bonus.	 Finally,	 the	 closeness	 of	 the	 expected	 results	
should	likewise	have	enhanced	the	electoral	impact	of	the	leaders	(King	2002b).	
Against	 this	 backdrop,	 our	 findings	 do	not	 deny	 a	 leader	 effect	 on	 voting.	
However,	the	analysis	of	reciprocal	effects	has	shown	that	the	image	of	the	leaders	
contributes	to	the	voters’	perception	of	parties’	utilities	significantly	less	than	the	
extent	 to	 which	 issues	 proximity	 causes	 voters’	 perception	 of	 the	 leader	 image.	
Therefore,	 when	 jointly	 employed	 to	 explain	 vote	 choice,	 party	 utilities	 direct	
	 	
contribution	 exceeds	 that	 of	 the	 leaders’	 image.	 This	 is	 true	 even	 in	 a	 political	
contest	 –	 like	 Italy’s	 Second	Republic	 –	where	 the	personalization	of	politics	has	















1	 A	 new	 electoral	 law,	 enacted	 four	 months	 before	 the	 2006	 election,	 reintroduced	








issues	 and	 secular‐religion	 issues	 based	 on	 the	 electoral	manifestoes	 shows	 the	 highest	
level	of	polarization	since	1963	(Bellucci	and	Heath,	2012).	
	
3	 Clarke	 et	 al.	 (2004:	 116‐8),	 in	 their	 study	 of	 leadership	 effects	 in	 the	 2001	 British	
elections,	also	address	the	question	whether	 feelings	towards	 leaders	may	be	 influenced	
by	vote	preference.	 	 In	diagnosing	this	possibility,	 they	carry	out	what	they	refer	to	as	a	
“weak	 exogeneity”	 test.	 	 The	 vote	 intention	 variable,	 as	 measured	 in	 the	 pre‐election	
survey,	 is	 included	on	the	right‐hand	side	of	 the	equation	 for	declared	vote	(in	the	post‐
election	 survey).	 	 They	 find	 that,	 even	 controlling	 for	 this	 lagged	 dependent	 variable,	
leadership	effects	are	still	significant.	 	A	difficulty	with	 this	 test,	as	 they	 footnote,	 is	 that	
having	this	lagged	dependent	variable	on	the	right‐hand	side	of	the	equation	will	tend	to	
“exaggerate	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 lagged	 variable,	 and	
depress	the	magnitude	of	other	predictors”	(Clarke	et	al.,	2004:	129).	 	This	is	one	reason	
why	this	Granger‐style	test	is	considered	a	“weak”	exogeneity	test	(Greene,	2003).		Also,	as	
is	 evident	 in	 their	own	comment,	 the	 test	would	depress	 the	 impact	of	 the	 independent	
variable	 of	 party,	 so	 rendering	 impossible	 a	 balanced	 comparison	 of	 party	 vs.	 leader	
effects.	 Therefore,	 we	 decided	 to	 follow	 a	 stronger	 exogenity	 test,	 developing	 a	












services	 need	 to	 be	 extended	 even	 through	 it	 might	 lead	 to	 more	 taxes.	 Others	 have	
intermediate	opinions.	Where	would	you	place	your	opinion?	Where	would	you	place	the	
centre‐left	 coalition’s	 position?	 Where	 would	 you	 place	 the	 centre‐right	 coalition’s	
position?	 (B)	 Some	 people	 say	 we	 get	 too	 many	 immigrants.	 Others	 say	 that	 we	 could	
accommodate	more	immigrants.	Where	would	you	place	your	opinion?	Where	would	you	



















8	 Personality	 traits	 considered	 are:	 resolute,	 responsible,	 reliable,	 skilled,	 competent,	
intelligent,	expert,	persevering.	
	
9	 Berlusconi	 appears	 especially	 strong	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘persevering’	 	 and	 ‘resolute’,	
characteristics	 that	are	widely	credited	 to	him	by	 the	whole	sample	of	 respondents	 (see	
the	 standard	 deviations)	 while	 ‘reliability’	 appears	 his	 main	 weakness	 (see	 Appendix).	
Prodi	does	not	seem	to	enjoy	any	particular	advantage	with	respect	to	Berlusconi	in	terms	
of	 personality	 traits,	 and	 his	 overall	 score	 on	 the	 additive	 index	 is	 slightly	 lower	 than	
Berlusconi’s.	
	
10	The	 inclusion	of	 respondents’	 self‐placement	on	 the	 left‐right	 scale	 (rather	 than	party	
identification)	as	summary	measure	for	their	long‐term	partisan	predispositions	is	based	
on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 left‐right	 continuum	 “seems	 to	 provide	 an	 even	 more	 important	
political	cue	for	West	European	publics	than	the	liberal‐conservative	continuum	does	for	
Americans”	 (Inglehart	 and	Klingemann,	 1976:	 243).	 Analyses	 of	 the	 Italian	 case	 further	
show	 the	 limited	 usefulness	 of	 party	 identification	 in	 the	 study	 of	 Italians’	 voting	
behaviour	(Garzia	and	Viotti,	2012).	
	
11	 Construction	 of	 the	 instruments	 goes	 forward	 in	 two	 stages.	 	 In	 the	 first‐stage	 the	




of	 procedure	 would	 repeat	 itself	 for	 estimated	 Eq.	 3	 for	 Issues	 (I).	 	 The	 second	 stage	
parameter	estimates	will	now	have	 the	desirable	property	of	statistical	consistency,	and	
the	 reciprocal	 effects	 can	 be	 correctly	 interpreted.	 For	 a	 lucid	 standard	 treatment	 of	






12	The	 Issues	 instrument,	 I,’	was	constructed	 from	the	 following:	 	age,	gender,	education,	
social	class,	church	attendance,	interest	in	politics,	and	retrospective	economic	evaluation.		
The	Leaders	 instrument,	L,’	was	constructed	 from	the	 following:	 	 age,	gender,	education,	
social	 class,	 interest	 in	 politics,	 exposure	 to	 TV	 news.	 Full	 estimation	 procedure	 is	
available	from	the	authors	upon	request.	
	
13	 As	 Kmenta	 (1997:	 365)	 notes,	 the	 Hausman	 test	 “can	 be	 used	 whenever	 we	 can	
implement	 an	 instrumental	 variables	 estimation	 procedure”.	 To	 illustrate,	 the	 test	
examines	whether	 the	residual,	U	(after	predicting	endogenous	 independent	variable	Y2	
from	 the	 selected	 instrumental	 variables)	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	 predictor	 of	 the	
dependent	variable,	Y1,	when	added	to	the	specification	of	the	original	equation	[e.g.,	Y1	=	
a	 +	 bY2	 +	 cU	 +	 e].	 Applying	 the	Hausman	 test	 to	 the	 equations	 of	 Table	 2,	we	 find	 the	















15	 The	 post‐post	 specification	 of	 the	 empirical	 model	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	
significantly	higher	number	of	cases	(slightly	less	than	a	hundred)	with	respect	to	the	pre‐
post	 specification	 due	 to	 a	 lower	 number	 of	 missing	 values	 on	 the	 leader	 and	 issue	
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	 B S.E. B S.E.
	
ProdiTraits	 ‐.018*** .001 ‐.023*** .001
BerlusconiTraits	 .018*** .002 .023*** .002
StrongLeader	 .014* .007 .021** .007
Issues	 .439*** .045 ‐ ‐
Issues’	(exogenous)	 ‐ ‐ .329*** .091
	












	 B S.E. B S.E.
	
LeftRight	 .022*** .003 .045*** .002
UnemploymentSalience ‐.024*** .006 ‐.036*** .007
CriminalitySalience	 .008 .006 .008 .006
Leaders	 .301*** .029 ‐ ‐
Leaders’	(exogeneous) ‐ ‐ .146** .053
	













	 B S.	E. B S.	E.	
Age	 ‐.013* .006 ‐.005 .006	
Gender	 .018 .185 .338* .172	
Education	 .006 .127 .059 .116	
ChurchAttendance	 ‐.038 .067 .034 .061	
SocialClass	 .232** .070 .146* .063	
Leaders’	(exogenous) 5.510*** .842 6.277*** .900	
Issues’	(exogeneous)	 9.844*** 1.247 8.649*** 1.173	
	


























	 N Minimum Maximum Mean	 Std.	Dev.
Vote	 771 0,0 1,0 ,4293	 ,49530
Age	 1377 18,0 94,0 48,6624	 17,33748
Gender	 1377 1,0 2,0 1,4989	 ,50018
Education	 1376 1,0 4,0 2,3164	 ,90218
ChurchAttendance	 1364 1,0 5,0 2,94	 1,454
SocialClass	 1372 1,0 5,0 3,4544	 1,44314
LeftRight	 1125 1,0 10,0 5,16	 2,742
StrongLeader	 1376 1,0 5,0 3,15	 ,990
UnemploymentSalience 1370 1,0 7,0 6,61	 ,990
CriminalitySalience	 1372 1,0 7,0 6,50	 1,015
Berlusconi	(Thermometer)	 1319 1,0 10,0 4,53	 3,090
Prodi	(Thermometer) 1281 1,0 10,0 4,93	 2,630
Leaders	 1275 0,0 1,0 ,4772	 ,28231
IssuesLeft	 892 0,0 18,0 5,4897	 4,38917
IssuesRight	 909 0,0 18,0 5,8286	 4,03689
Issues	 851 0,0 1,0 ,4938	 ,19402
	
Silvio	Berlusconi	 	 	 	 	 	
Reliable	 1281 1,0 4,0 2,24	 1,033
Competent	 1280 1,0 4,0 2,81	 ,968
Responsible	 1277 1,0 4,0 2,53	 ,979
Resolute	 1286 1,0 4,0 3,52	 ,745
Skilled	 1287 1,0 4,0 2,95	 ,987
Intelligent	 1274 1,0 4,0 3,31	 ,818
Expert	 1281 1,0 4,0 3,05	 ,899
Persevering	 1284 1,0 4,0 3,58	 ,670
*Sum	8‐items	 1189 8,0 32,0 24,1506	 5,04371
	 	
	
	 N Minimum Maximum Mean	 Std.	Dev.
	
Romano	Prodi	 	 	 	 	 	
Reliable	 1233 1,0 4,0 2,61	 ,954
Competent	 1247 1,0 4,0 2,87	 ,905
Responsible	 1226 1,0 4,0 2,83	 ,906
Resolute	 1253 1,0 4,0 2,79	 ,880
Skilled	 1231 1,0 4,0 2,69	 ,903
Intelligent	 1250 1,0 4,0 3,17	 ,803
Expert	 1260 1,0 4,0 3,00	 ,854
Persevering	 1255 1,0 4,0 2,88	 ,853
*Sum	8‐items	 1115 8,0 32,0 23,0227	 5,67613
	 	
InterestPolitics	 1373 1,0 4,0 2,12	 ,882
MediaExposure	 1336 ‐1,0 1,0 ‐,1800	 ,97259
RetroEconomics	 1355 1,0 5,0 2,01	 ,883
	
	
